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 This study examines novel data-driven models of governance emerging
from the Global South, specifically India and China, enabled by Net-based
technologies. The first model, the biometric identity scheme or ‘Aadhaar’
project in India consolidates citizens’ digital identities to enable access to
government services such as welfare benefits. The second model is
China’s Social Credit System. By combining the citizens’ financial records,
online shopping data, social media behaviour and employment history, the
system will produce a personal score for each citizen. This rating system
will be used to measure the citizens’ trustworthiness. This research
unpacks these value-embedded systems posited as digital innovations to
strengthen citizenship through new forms of political participation,
inclusion and representation. In doing so, we are confronted with what
constitutes as “democracy” in this datafied and global era, beyond the
universalisms that are on offer today.
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Introduction
Democracy is not just an ideal but also an aspiration for a just system of
governance, and a model of what a ‘good’ society looks like. Democracy at
its most basic is the rule of the majority, the rule of the commoners, and it
was the most successful political idea of the twentieth century (Ball, et al.,
2016). However, democracy as we know it is under serious threat. The
political climate today reveals how the old champions and power centers
of the West such as the United Kingdom and the United States are moving
towards non-inclusive and even discriminatory social policies, defying the
packaged dream called democracy (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). What we
see in the last decade is entrenched oligarchy in liberal democracies in the
West that has resulted in what Thomas Piketty (2014) has shown us is an
astonishing widening of social and economic inequality. As these nations
become inward-looking, nostalgic of a fictional monochromatic past of a
non-diverse state, nations beyond the West have gained credence in
promoting alternative models of governance for the common good. This
paper examines two new models emerging from the Global South,
specifically India and China, enabled by new data-driven and digital
technologies.
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The first model, the biometric identity initiative known as the Aadhaar or
the Unique Identification Number (UID) project in India is an ambitious
and historically unprecedented databased model of governance. Major
news outlets such as the BBC endorse this effort as they report how the
poor, “with no proof to offer of their existence will leapfrog into a national
online system, another global first, where their identities can be validated
anytime anywhere in a few seconds” [1]. The goal of the project is to
provide a unique identification number to each of the 1.2 billion Indian
citizens through the capturing of their fingerprints, iris scans and
photographs. This consolidated digital identity will serve as a primary
portal through which citizens can gain access to all social services such as
welfare, banking and food subsidies for those at the margins of society. It
aims to bring all of the undocumented poor into the system.
R.S. Sharma, the secretary of the Department of Electronics & Information
Technology in India declared that, “digital India is not for rich people [...]
it is for poor people” [2]. There is some truth to this claim. It is a fact that
majority of India’s citizens lack any form of identity such as a passport or
a resident permit, making it difficult to disseminate welfare benefits to the
masses. Intermediaries have capitalized on this by using fake identities to
siphon off much of the 60 billion dollars in welfare benefits earmarked for
the poor (Arora, 2019). It is no wonder that this technocratic intervention
is framed as a contemporary crusader against corruption. However,
numerous challenges inundate this process including possible privacy and
human rights violations, the rise of fake online identities and weak
institutional measures against data breaches.
The second governance model from China has a vision of a good society
and a good citizen and the Chinese state is in the midst of creating a
unified digital system to foster this vision. By 2020, China intends to
institute the Social Credit System (Shahin and Zheng, 2018). By
combining the citizens’ financial records, online shopping data, social
media behavior and employment history, the system will produce a ‘social
credit’ score for each citizen. This rating system will be used to measure a
citizen’s trustworthiness. Each citizen will earn ‘credit’ through good
behavior enacted online and offline. This will directly affect their access to
all kinds of public services including the nation’s financial credit system. In
essence, it is a value-embedded system meant to encourage good
behavior and discourage bad behavior. This system can become punitive
as the scanning of social media accounts can sentence people to
unemployment, slow Internet connectivity and travel visa bans based on
non-compliance to the party’s rules and values (Markey, 2016).
Technology companies that do not comply with the party’s ethics could be
extensively fined for supporting so-called immoral and indecent content.
By looking at democracy’s three core dimensions — the socio-political, the
economic and the legal — and how big data intersects with them, this
study analyzes the following questions in the context of India and China:
Does digitization of citizen data reduce or entrench inequality in
representation and participation? Are these computing systems enabling a
more level playing field by helping citizens leapfrog their economic status
and circumvent traditional intermediaries of power? To what degree does
this datafication ensure citizen’s rights? This paper reveals a complex
narrative that goes beyond the Western conceptualization of democracy,
and provokes a re-examining of this concept as governance becomes
increasingly affected by an automation of decision-making.
Current media and scholarly discourses on datafication interventions tend
to focus on the rising Orwellian futures that these systems can foster.
These discussions, while legitimately concerned on the rising
authoritariansm in both these contexts, seem to fall short in pushing for
an explanation on the popularity of a number of data-driven measures
instituted in the everyday governance systems. Also, they do not make
the effort to situate these techno-developments in the long and complex
socio-cultural legacies in both regions. Perhaps this is due to the fear that
building an understanding of the full spectrum of affordances of these new
systems can be misread as a justification for techno-autocracy. However,
as this paper argues, by perpetuating the reductionism of these novel
developments as purely oppressive instruments of the state, we will lose
the opportunity to broaden our perspectives on how democracy as a
project is being interpreted by diverse and emerging new world orders. By
juxtaposing these emerging databased systems against the normative
Western model, this study reveals the crossroads we are at when it comes
to what constitutes as social inclusion, free market participation and
citizen rights in this digital and global age.
 
Democracy and governance in this datafication era
The world is experiencing a regression in democracy. According to the
“Democracy Index” from the Economist Intelligence Unit, 89 countries
regressed in 2017 (Economist, n.d.). The latest Transformation Index from
the Bertelsmann Foundation, another think tank, which focuses on
emerging economies concluded in their report that, the “quality of
democracy ... has fallen to its lowest level in 12 years” (Bertelsmann
Stiftung, n.d.). These metrics are dictated by liberal democratic values
that emphasize a freely elected government, strong individual and
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minority rights, the rule of law and the independence of institutions
(Economist, 2018a).
In recent years we have seen a separation of liberalism and democracy
with the rise of populist driven referendums, the suppression of the press,
the curtailing of minority rights, and the voting in of strongmen who
promise to exercise their authority for national governance. A 2017 Pew
poll of 38 countries found that a significant minority group approved of
non-democratic alternatives; 24 percent were fine with military rule and
26 percent found the idea of “a strong leader” who “can make decisions
without interference from parliament or the courts” appealing (Wike, et
al., 2017).
This begs the question: is democracy as we know it under threat?
Alternatively, should we be re-questioning the parameters of democracy to
better comprehend this contemporary conundrum? At the turn of the
twentieth century, liberal democracy supplanted Marxism as the prevailing
global ideology. Today, its position is less secure. Plattner (2015)
embarked on assessing whether democracy was declining by looking
closely at its legitimacy and attractiveness among citizens worldwide. The
quality of governance appears to be at the forefront in this discussion as
citizens who are new to this ideology remain unconvinced of democracy’s
capacity to build the modern state. Fukuyama contends that, “the
legitimacy of many democracies around the world depends less on the
deepening of their democratic institutions than on their ability to provide
high-quality governance” [3]. He calls for an attending to the more prosaic
aspects of state building such as public administration and policy
implementation in these so called democratic systems.
Part of this has to do with the rise of China’s power in the geopolitical
sphere, offering other developing countries an alternative ideology and
governance structure to the prescribed democratic template of the United
States and Europe. In the last decade alone, China has embarked on
numerous social reforms that has brought five hundred million of their
citizens out of poverty (Wu, 2016). Their positioning has been amplified by
the fact that India, the world’s largest democracy, did not rise to the
global expectations in economic growth and welfare of their citizens
(Banerjee, 2013). The current Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, the
strongman of India, has in recent years taken inspiration from the Chinese
style governance to chalk a future model of statehood (Chacko and
Jayasuriya, 2017).
Both nations are currently reconfiguring their governance by leveraging on
the affordances of new digital technologies and their citizen’s heightened
enthusiasm and even faith in such systems. Today, these nations have
more mobile phone users than the rest of the world combined, in spite of
the fact that only a fraction of their citizens have gained access to the
Internet (Statista, 2018). They both promise their citizens an improved life
by using centralized databased systems to redistribute resources fairly and
efficiently, to empower them to compete in the marketplace and to keep
them secure.
These measures can arguably build trust among their constituents, a
fundamental characteristic to foster a democratic society. As pointed out
by Uslaner, “societies don’t become trusting because they are more
democratic. They become trusting because they distribute their resources
more equally” [4]. As Przeworski puts it, democracy entails “not just rights
but also conditions,” which needs to be explicitly incorporated in the
concept of democracy [5]. When evaluating the quality of democracy,
scholars have paid disproportionate emphasis on the processes and not on
the outcomes. By focusing on the outcomes including citizen’s perceptions,
we may be able to move beyond the narrow democratic versus
authoritarian construct that has dictated the analysis of governance
systems. These approaches may help broaden our notion of democracy
that can “rival the minimal definition of democracy” [6].
Hence, this paper critically examines these databased interventions in
these two contexts to address the pressing question of whether the notion
of democracy demands a rethinking, re-framing and even reordering of
criteria on what makes a ‘good’ society in the datafied era.
 
From e-governance to datafication: Concerns on inclusion,
participation and rights
With the onset of social media platforms, cheap mobile data plans and
phones and digitization technologies, governments have become far more
enabled in reaching and influencing their citizen’s behaviors and
perceptions. This informational governance entails two interrelated
processes: (1) new forms of governing through information, and (2)
transformative changes in governance institutions due to the new
information flows (Soma, et al., 2016). The increased human
interconnectedness through e-governance, self-organization, private
governing and empowerments are identified as key elements that can
contribute to institutional sustainability, the core goal for public
institutions.
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In the last two decades, a vast scholarship has risen on e-governance
particularly outside the West as a means to leapfrog chronic barriers in
inclusion and participation (Garson, 2006; Kumar, et al., 2018; Linders, et
al., 2015). E-governance projects have managed to reach out to long
neglected groups such as rural and women’s groups. They have facilitated
local community building for the management of common pool resources,
such as fisheries and agriculture (Arora, 2016a, 2005; Masiero, 2015;
Sreekumar, 2007). This has increased the bargaining power of
disadvantaged groups and mitigated some of the exploitative practices of
previously monopolistic markets. While much of the evidence points to
improvements in communication and dissemination of public services,
there have been major challenges in creating deeper structural impacts
and generating trust among the citizens. Many e-governance platforms
while attempting to become two-way communication portals to generate
participation, have for the most part remained a top-down process.
Recently however, informational governance has undergone a significant
shift as infrastructures of information have become increasingly complex
and specialized with the rise of big data, giving rise to ‘algorithmic
governance’ (Kitchin, 2017). Algorithms are sets of defined steps
structured to process instructions/data to produce an output. They are
increasingly being used to nudge, bias, guide, provoke, control,
manipulate and constrain human behaviour, becoming ‘smarter’ in these
functions as more data from citizens are collected and fed into their
system. In other words, this creates a governance ‘loop’ of a system
acquiring information, processing it, using it and then learning from what
it has done (Pasquale, 2015). This mechanization of governance has many
benefits including enhancing the efficiency, speed, comprehensiveness and
fairness of the state and the market (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier,
2013).
However, this datafication has a dark side, as they are fundamentally also
technologies of surveillance, or ‘dataveillance’ (van Dijck, 2014). In recent
years, studies have revealed that these systems have an increasing
capacity to (re)produce and amplify already discriminatory practices. Their
asymmetric power structures can further obscure the fostering of new
divides in data access, interpretation, representation and ethics (Leurs and
Shepherd, 2017). This can increase social inequality as their automating
function becomes normalized. As people become sorted through these
systems, the system’s logic of who gets privileges and who gets
blacklisted for instance are hidden. The citizen may start to slowly
“disappear” as their role becomes shrunk to a ‘user’ and ‘consumer’ with
the adoption of automated governance systems that may dictate how they
think and act in society (Gregory and Bowker, 2016). This dehumanized
decision-making can obscure accountability that would typically fall on the
shoulders of government administrators and elected officials. In other
words, these new bureaucratic systems naturalize a specific governance
logic, undermining political struggle.
This taming of political movements has roots in neutralizing resistences to
colonial empire building. Traditional surveillance architectures such as
fingerprinting have historically disciplined bodies and systems to the rules
of enslavement, exploitation and extraction (Arora, forthcoming). Far from
enabling freedom and choice for the people, they have serviced those in
power through their effective networks of knowledge. Hence, it is
reasonable to argue that their inherent characteristics can undermine the
legitimacy of algorithmic governance and in proxy, the state itself who
proclaim to now instrumentalize these systems for the common good. This
datafication can challenge the fabric of democracy as they disrupt the
pathway for citizens to play a role in decision-making given the increasing
opacity of these technical systems.
Besides the state, technical and scientific experts have gained new powers
in the shaping of political matters as they are able to automate values that
influence entire societies. This can be viewed as an
expert Raj,(an imperium of experts) whose modes
of acquiring authority, especially in global
institutions, are as opaque to ordinary citizens as
the self-legitimating claims of rulers in distant
metropoles were to colonial subjects living in the
peripheries of empire. [7]
Clearly, we have at hand a new intermediary in democracy-making that
state actors have become dependent upon. Government bureaucrats need
to be educated in the critical assessment of information governance
infrastructures as they need to be able to explain decisions that affect
their citizens. Hence, for machine learning to work for the well-being of
the people, we need to institute ”procedural fairness“ as “our systems
don’t only have to work well; the population has to trust them” [8].
Amidst these concerns, it is easy to forget that humans have been relying
on machines to make many decisions for them from the area of banking to
insurance. Machines have been enabling institutions to assess risks and
supporting the scaling of such practices for a working democracy. The
introduction of machine learning may, “have changed the way that the
decision is made, but it does not take away from the fact that machines
have been making lots of decisions for a long time and people and society
seem largely comfortable with this idea.” [9] We need to juxtapose these
automation systems against human decision-making that has often been
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fraught with unconscious bias, hunches and errors. Machines reduce this
inconsistency.
Moreover, while weighing the benefits and concerns of machine learning
for governance, it is worth asking whether it is ethical to withhold these
new technologies, particularly if we are denying the improvement of the
citizen’s life considerably. For instance, machines can process applications
much faster than people can. Is it ethical to make someone wait for 30
days to receive a notification of eligibility for a service, especially if we can
give them an answer in a day?
The fact is that while there are several reasons to be concerned about
automating governance, there are also good reasons to see these systems
as opportunities to circumvent human prejudice. This is especially true in
contexts where socio-cultural biases are deeply embedded in society;
here, technological platforms may evoke more trust and hope for change
through smart learning especially among members of marginalized
groups. Through their usage, they may be able to ‘teach’ or ‘game’ the
algorithm in ways that favor them, opening up more of a chance to
exercise their agency than with traditional social institutions.
In the following sections, we critically examine how the datafied
governance models of India and China measure up as they each promise
progress for their people.
 
The case of India: The biometric identity project
The biometric registration, Aadhaar or the Unique Identity (UID) project
has been around since 2009. In its early stages, this project was marketed
as voluntary, and geared towards the poor. It was intended to include the
undocumented into the system so as to be able to correctly disseminate
the social benefits to the right individuals. In 2012, it became mandatory
for all citizens to have an UID, otherwise they would be denied the
entitlements as well as any government services (Arora, 2016b).
There has been a number of improvements in the governance systems
with the introduction of UIDs, particularly in the tackling of corruption and
establishing more transparency.
The use of technology to computerize,
communicate, and monitor the movement of goods
and grain, the opening of post office and bank
accounts for payment of NREGA wages, the use of
mobile phones to let people know when their
rations limits are reached so that they may watch
and collect their entitlements, the use of GPS to
track the movement of vehicles carrying grain to
the shops — these have already greatly improved
systems. [10]
There is econometric evidence now of the impact of UID on reducing the
leakages in public programs, particularly in the dissemination of fuel
subsides (Barnwal, 2017). There is a national program that provides eight
billion dollars in fuel subsidies for domestic cooking. Prior to UID, the
welfare schemes were inundated with identity fraud. There were few ways
to verify identity that were not very costly or subject to corruption by local
officials who over-reported the disbursement by producing ‘ghost’
beneficiaries. In 2010, the number of households that drew fuel subsidy
benefits was about 50 percent higher than the estimates shown by the
2011 census. With the introduction of the UID, it was found to significantly
strengthen the state’s ability to target program beneficiaries and purge the
system of ghost beneficiaries.
Masiero (2015) in her research on the impact of UID on India’s Public
Distribution System (PDS) in anti-poverty programs in Kerala found that
while this new technology did improve the dissemination of people’s
entitlements, it did not address several issues that continue to hamper its
functioning. The PDS is the oldest, most widely available food security net
in India, aimed at providing monthly rationed quotas to poor households.
For the longest time, there have been severe leakages in these subsidies
due to the ‘rice mafia,’ an illegal consortium of people who have been
systematically diverting these PDS goods to the private market. However,
the leakage problem have triggered reforms at the state level, such as
establishing an allocation software program to ascertain the needs of local
ration dealers and the Inspection Monitoring System of routine and
recorded inspections of these ration shops to combat the illicit siphoning of
PDS commodities.
The UID program was a welcome intervention that built upon these
reforms to strengthen such accountability mechanisms. This system
ensured that the sale of the rationed goods was diverted to the right
constituents through the linking of the biometric details to real
beneficiaries. While this is clearly a positive contribution to governance,
there have been barriers to the efficacy of this system. Weak
computational facilities, chronic power shortages, inconsistent connectivity
and no legal recourse to reclaim hijacked identities that end up excluding
genuine beneficiaries remain unsolved.
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Corruption continues as some well-off households were able to get
themselves registered as ‘Below Poverty Line’ (BPL) recipients, thereby
benefiting from such subsidies. Ration shops complain that without this
cheating they are unable to sustain themselves given the low government
pay. Most importantly, tackling the rice mafia through monitoring of the
ration shops is only one part of the problem. What continues the abuse of
the PDS is the ‘border mafia’ who steal these commodities before they
even reach the shops, often in complicity with a number of privacy
companies. In summary, after almost a decade of UID’s operationalization
in India, it is worth systematically considering how this project is fairing in
its goal for inclusion and participation, some of the hallmarks of a
democratic system.
 
Obstacles to India’s databased democratization
The fact is that UID continues to face considerable hurdles, partly due to
the fact that they did not consider fully the country’s diverse demographic
and the environmental conditions within which their citizens operate. Four
key areas of concern in the implementation of UID are, 1) digitizing
identities, 2) data protection, security and the right to privacy, 3) market
inclusion and corporate misuse and 4) political participation.
1. Digitizing identities and self-representation: Several studies have been
published that have revealed the problems of relying on biometric data
such as fingerprints and iris scans (Arora, 2016b; Gates, 2011; Sarkar,
2014). The system has been particularly disadvantageous to some of the
people it intended to enable, that being among the low-income citizens.
The quality of fingerprints of manual laborers were found to be
problematic as they were faded and thereby difficult to read (Rao, 2013).
An estimated 8–10 million people have cataracts due to malnourishment,
serving as an obstacle to the iris scans. This has resulted in the automatic
denial of services to these constituents. Nilekani, the Infosys chairman
overseeing this project claims that UID has saved India over nine billion
dollars by eliminating fraud. Khera (2017a) however argues that what
passes as ‘savings’ is often the result of denial of legal entitlements for
lack of Aadhaar.
For example, in rural Jharkhand, an old woman died of starvation as the
system refused to recognize her right to food (Bhatia, 2018). Upon
investigation it was revealed that her identity was hacked by someone
who diverted her pension to an account of a person who died in 1992. It
was also revealed that due to weak connectivity, there was an inconsistent
flow of information which prevented some people from receiving life-
saving benefits. More disturbingly, there appears to be a correlation
between victims of starvation and caste as a number of them were listed
to be low-income Muslims, Dalits (‘untouchables’) and members of remote
tribes.
2. Data protection, Security and the right to privacy: When designing the
UID project, there was little consideration of aspects of citizen privacy and
data protection (Jayaram, 2015). This is partly due to the fact that it was
only in 2017 that India gained its first privacy law that demanded
solutions to data protection (Balaji, 2018). This has complicated matters
of data ownership and thereby brought into question the mandatory
nature of this project, especially if the law sides with the citizen’s right to
data ownership. The fact is that the right to privacy of information and
data protection is an issue that goes beyond just the implementation of
UID (Verma, 2018). For transparency reasons, state election commission
Web sites have traditionally disclosed the personal information of every
person registered to vote online and, in many cases, these were published
along with information on caste, religion, address, photographs and
financial information. Agencies scrape these databases and sell them.
Few measures were taken to secure these databases and there were no
plans to counter illegal and abusive actions such as hacking, leakages,
intrusive profiling, tagging, false duplicating or identity fraud and tracking.
For example, the Tribune, an English-language daily, revealed that for
eight dollars or so, its reporters had bought illegal access to the entire UID
database and for an extra five dollars, they were able to print ID cards
with any UID number (Tribune (India), 2018). It was found that 200
government entities published private UID data, and some private firms
were caught using the UID data for purposes outside their licensed
agreements. They made regulators custodians of data which is clearly a
conflict of interest.
Part of the security issue relates to the convergence of databases. This
centralization and inter-linking of multiple databases of each citizen can
result in profiling and self-censorship, as well as unwanted tracking and
targeted discriminatory practices (Khera, 2017b). Bringing different data
silos together such as travel history, health, banking, education and
employment has allowed the government to construct a profile of a
citizen. This brings to question who controls the citizen’s personal
integrity. Further, the compromise of a person’s database is essentially
irreversible as you cannot change your genetic data or fingerprints in
response to a leak. In 2017, 200 students in Mumbai replicated their
fingerprints on a widely used resin to fake biometric attendance, bringing
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to national attention the vulnerability to identity and data theft (Qazi,
2017).
In the face of these concerns, the common argument is that privacy is a
luxury and an elitist concern as the vast disadvantaged communities in
India are actually empowered by being included (Arora, forthcoming).
Some argue that the Hindi word for privacy ‘nijta’ is not a colloquially used
term, posing the question of whether privacy is culturally relative. Even if
this may be so, the fact remains that the right to privacy is now being
coded into law. Thereby, UID administrators will need to make explicit how
they will secure their citizen’s identities as part of this larger momentum
on providing human dignity.
3. Market inclusion and corporate misuse: The government has not
released explicit policy on corporate involvement in this process and to
what degree could they and other third-party vendors use vast and
converged databases of a citizen for private ends. For instance, foreign
companies such as Accenture and L1 Identity Solutions are some of the
third-party entities that were engaged in the management of these
databases (Times of India, 2010). Accenture was found to be linked to the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Smart Borders Project and L1
Identity Solutions was found to have close links with the French
government and the CIA. This puts at risk the national interest and
security of the citizens as their databases could be used against them at a
point in the near future.
The goal of financial inclusion has also been fraught with obstacles and
concerns. The UID project established a partnership with a number of
authorized user agencies including banks, mobile phone companies,
insurance, hospitals and state and central government offices to
streamline access to loans, licenses and other documents to ease the
efforts of citizens to participate in the market economy. The problem
however occurs when the institutions themselves have not modified their
criteria to ease the barriers of entry, which serves as a reminder that the
proof of identification is just one factor in a larger process of market
inclusion. For example, banks continue to reject low-value customers in
spite of the UID system as they are considered high-risk (Mehta and
Kulkarni, 2016).
4. Political participation: Indian politics is immersed in giving special
reservations to scheduled castes and tribes, and ‘other backward castes,’
groups that have been chronically discriminated against due to the caste
system (Arora, forthcoming). Citizens have a high stake in being digitized
in one of these categories to maximize state benefits. The problem with
digitizing citizens in India along lines of caste is that it does not take into
consideration the dynamism of such groupings. Numerous protests by Jats
(a historically privileged group of land-owning peasants) is pressurizing
the Indian government to include them in the ‘Other Backward Caste’
category so they can be guaranteed university places and government
jobs.
Contrary to conventional polling, intra-caste hierarchy and evolving
political arrangements between caste groups creates a challenge in the
digitization of these group identities, linking them to special state benefits.
For instance, collective bargaining of caste groups in India is typically
linked to garnering votes and alliances to particular political parties.
However, contrary to conventional assumptions of caste groups being
divided, the Dalits (the “untouchables”) have time and again partnered
with the Brahmins (the high caste) to strengthen their bargain with
political parties. Further, current day realities defy conventional notions of
caste and class as being mutually exclusive. Hence, the digitization of the
Indian citizen promises to freeze privilege along lines of communal politics
strengthened during the British Raj over two centuries (Arora,
forthcoming).
To conclude, the biometric governance system in India is innovative as it
confronts and provides a legitimate circumvention to a number of chronic
barriers to democratic participation and market inclusion. We should not
undermine the tremendous challenges that come with a colonial legacy
and its prevailing institutional infrastructures, a deeply entrenched caste
system that justifies social inequality, and a long history of corporate
monopolies and corruption. This techno-system provides the state with an
imaginative solution to tackling parallel illicit economies run by the ‘rice
mafia,’ ‘fuel mafia’ and other powerful entities. Citizens have the right to
an identity to become visible and active in the public and the market
sphere. Yet, as this system has played out in reality, it reminds us of the
limits to technocratic reform unless and until simultaneous changes are
made in existing social practices and institutional arrangements.
Otherwise, it has the danger of entrenching inequality and serving as yet
another system that marginalized groups need to battle to be heard and
seen in ways that are fair and representative of their social condition.
 
The case of China: The social credit score project
According to the Chinese government’s “Planning outline for the
construction of a social credit system,” the system aims to measure and
enhance ‘trust’ between and among government, commercial sectors and
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citizens and to “strengthen sincerity in government affairs, commercial
sincerity, social sincerity and the construction of judicial credibility”
(Botsman, 2017). While this system will be launched in 2020, evidence is
surfacing on how these databased systems are being used in different
social zones to promote social safety, financial inclusion and citizen
participation. Moreover, this system is not novel per se as it builds on an
already existing and highly popular commercial service called ‘Sesame
Credit’ (芝麻信用), implemented by the Alibaba Group (Kostka, 2018).
In 2017, Sesame Credit already had 520 million users (Sun, 2017).
Having launched in 2015, this system has collected enormous amounts of
data from e-commerce. Alibaba’s computing of the score takes five factors
into account, namely a) credit history, b) fulfilment capacity, (a user’s
ability to fulfil his or her contract obligations) c) verified personal
information (including mobile phone number and address), d) behavior
and preference, (for example, whether the user chooses to buy diapers or
books versus play video games, giving higher rating to the former
category,) and e) interpersonal relationships, what type of friends do they
keep (Ding, et al., 2017). This allows users with better scores to gain
‘special privileges’ such as renting a car without leaving a deposit, a faster
check-in at hotels, cash loans and even fast-tracking visa applications. In
other words, it’s a datafied loyalty scheme, to reward ‘good’ consumers
and punish ‘bad’ consumers, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ defined according to the
system’s rules. In fact, high scores have become a status symbol, having
been used to attract suitors on certain dating sites (Botsman, 2017).
Clearly, the last two categories signal moral policing, that some fear may
nudge citizens to align with the party’s specific socio-political outlook. This
has provoked a vast negative discourse in Western media of this system
being synonymous to an Orwellian ‘big brother’ technology. As per the
traditional template of liberal democracy, this system is clearly
authoritarian. However, if we are to factor in efficient and effective
governance, citizen perception and behavior, increased market and social
inclusion and participation, this becomes a more complicated conversation
as the following points reveal.
1. Legitimacy of the state: Meng (2010) argues against the constrictive
nature of the Western paradigm of democratization to comprehend
contemporary Chinese society. Through the traditional lens, electoral
politics is equated with legitimate state power that can be challenged
through laws and citizen speech, including through the use of new
communication technologies. However, China’s long communist past, she
argues, has given legitimacy for the authoritarian state, establishing
paternalism as the normative relations between the regime and the
Chinese people.
Chinese censorship comes with elaborate systems of information control
including the Great Firewall of China and the 50 Cent Army (五毛党), where
thousands of moderators manually block content unfavorable to the party
and instill misinformation and comments to change or diffuse conversation
online (King, et al., 2017, 2013). While this is clearly an undemocratic
modality of control, it can be argued that the West has fostered
technological oligarchies that override the interest of the society for that of
corporate profit.
If AI [artificial intelligence] remains under the
control of market forces, it will inexorably result in
a super-rich oligopoly of data billionaires who reap
the wealth created by robots that displace human
labor, leaving massive unemployment in their wake.
(Xiang, 2018)
The fact is that currently, democratic states are struggling to reign in the
multinational technology monopolies who are more accountable to their
shareholders than the citizens in nations they operate. Facebook, Google
and Amazon continue to control the majority of citizen data emanating
from social, search and purchase behavior, trapping users in their digitally
walled gardens. It is worth noting however that while this is certainly the
reality today, a number of measures are being instrumentalized by the
state such as the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) to put
citizens before corporations. The fact that this is even possible is a
testament to the resilience of liberal democracy in spite of Silicon Valley’s
data dominance. This seems quite different in China where little opposition
or dissent is possible.
That being said, China through a series of reforms in the last two decades
has managed to uplift many marginalized populations socio-economically,
providing opportunity and dignity to these citizens. In recent polls on the
social credit system across income groups, it was found that more than 70
percent either somewhat or strongly approved these measures of
governance (Liang, et al., 2018). This can partly be explained by the way
in which the state has structured its relationship with corporations.
Chinese governments while providing Internet firms with extensive
commercial freedom to innovate and compete, have streamlined them
closely to account for the state’s development goals. For instance, each of
the Chinese tech giants have been given a certain responsibility to make
China a national data champion: Alibaba collects data needed for smart
cities, Baidu for autonomous vehicles, and Tencent for medical imaging.
Hence, while liberal democracies are becoming more enslaved by their
‘technopolies’ (Postman, 1992), the Chinese government ensures that
4/3/2019 Benign dataveillance? Examining novel data-driven governance systems in India and China | Arora | First Monday
https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/9840/7745#author 9/16
their companies work to promote the state’s vision of being a global leader
and innovator in a databased economy.
It is well worth noting that the Chinese centralization approach is akin to
one of the most revered ideologies in Western democracy by one of
America’s founding fathers, Alexander Hamilton, who argued for strong
central institutions in the economy and politics (Pasquale, 2015). This
approach would treat data-driven companies as public utilities so that the
benefits could be distributed fairly in society, as expected of a democratic
society. In other words, when censorship is mixed in with good and
creative governance with a promise for a better life, it becomes more
challenging to paint a black and white picture of Chinese-style
authoritarianism as purely that of Orwellian oppression.
2. Financial inclusion and market participation: The financial sector in
China is controlled primarily by the state (Wang, 2018). Hence, it is no
surprise that the fin-tech or the ‘Internet finance’ business in China is
subjected to the same regulatory measures. The three specific forms of
this new industry — third-party payments, peer-to-peer lending and the
money market funds — have broadened the banking sector and succeeded
in including much of China’s citizenry into this fold. By 2017, China
became the fin-tech global leader, taking over more than half the global
market, much in alignment with the broader vision to be the trail-blazer in
all things tech (Economist, 2017). Fin-tech, due to its leveraging of big
data, algorithms and blockchain technologies, have succeeded in
disrupting this traditional sector and fundamentally changing the ease with
which users can access loans, pay their mortgages and fees, shop and
send money to loved ones through personalized electronic wallets.
With a deep communist history and thereby a lack of assets or credit
history for banks to use to evaluate and manage risk, social credit scores
offer an alternative model to banking. This consolidated citizen rating
provides assurance to these institutions by calculating trustworthiness
based on past and ongoing behaviors of citizens. This has exponentially
infused financial capital into the society, enabling citizens to mobilize and
invest in themselves and their entrepreneurial efforts for a better social
life (Kshetri, 2016). It has made consumption highly efficient and even
engaging through popular apps like AliPay, WeChat Wallet and other such
payment tools. While this is a promising development, we need to be
cautious as emerging studies showcase a growing socio-economic
inequality, especially along the faultlines of the rural-urban divide (Wang,
2018).
3. Social order and citizen tracking: Given this is a unified state system,
data can come from diverse locations and events. In early May 2018, for
example, a young man from Shanxi was blacklisted and thereby banned
from traveling by train for 180 days as part of a Social Credit
implementation (Fullerton, 2018). He reportedly jumped on the ticket
barrier at the Yangling Station, invoking this penalty. In Shenzhen, police
have instituted facial recognition technology to catch jaywalkers, and
other traffic violations that will affect a citizen’s score. While foreign media
frames this as “creepy,” Chinese media describes this as an “avant-garde”
way of creating a “harmonious” society (Koetse, 2018).
The credit score has arguably had some success in reducing revenge
pornography, cyberbullying and online misogyny (Karsten and West,
2018). The scoring system has integrated a blacklist of more than six
million people who have defaulted on court fines into its database. This
system has already helped courts punish more than 1.21 million
defaulters, improving their enforcement mechanisms on those who break
the law. These measures have been received positively as anxiety about
“piànzi” (骗子) or swindlers is high among Chinese citizens. This system
helps people to detect those who are untrustworthy when doing business
online. It has also increased the faith in law (essential for democracy) as
these new measures of enforcement come into play.
These databased systems have a long legacy in China. In the Song
dynasty, a system known as “baojia” (保甲) was devised, requiring
households to take turns to monitor each other’s activities. Under Mao, the
regime instituted the “dang’an” (档案) system, where dossiers were kept
on every individual on their political and personal transgressions (Liang, et
al., 2018). Today, these communal vigilante systems are supplanted by
urban neighborhood committees, “elected” by residents from party
approved candidates, to oversee the specific urban grid they are assigned
to and report on local issues to the central government. Within this
context, the social credit score is not as radical to Chinese citizens, helping
with the normalization of this 24/7 social surveillance system. Obedience
is gamified, where, “the government is attempting to make obedience feel
like gaming. It is a method of social control dressed up in some points-
reward system” (Botsman, 2017).
4. Social inclusion, representation and minority rights: Social inequality in
China arises primarily due to the urban/rural income disparity ratio
(Sautman, 2014). Given that over half of Han are urban as compared to
for instance, only 20 percent of Uygurs, this divide appears along ethnic
lines. A global study among 16 countries on ethnic subordination and
discrimination recorded that when citizens were asked if governments
should make an effort to prevent discrimination based on a person’s race
or ethnicity, 79 percent of people in other countries were in agreement. In
contrast, 90 percent of Chinese citizens agreed. Further, when asked about
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equal treatment for all people, while 69 percent on average said it was
important, Chinese results were 90 percent. Through this lens, China is far
above average in their alignment with international human right norms
regarding minority rights.
That being said, the Hukou policy of the 1950s entrenched the rural-urban
divide, which strictly controls household registrations and movements of
workers within the country (Afridi, et al., 2015). This has allowed for the
policing of rural migrant workers since the 1950s. While these illegal
migrants have helped build the urban economies, they continue to be
denied access to welfare benefits such as healthcare, education and social
housing. The expectation was to eventually push these peasants back to
their rural lands after taking advantage of their labor. In the meantime,
two kinds of citizenship were formed, one the urban citizen with a higher
social safety net and the other, the rural migrant citizen, or ‘second-class’
citizen.
These systems have becoming datafied through the social credit score,
creating a mix of amplifying inequality while at the same time, providing a
safer alternative for laborers that need to provide identification at all
times. Evidence abounds on how the Chinese police track migrants and
impose fines based on the ‘three withouts,’ meaning ‘without ID card,
without temporary residence permit and without proof of employment’
(Sautman, 2014). Migrants are often day laborers and cannot carry with
them many belongings on construction sites. This creates a situation of
rising police harassment, resulting often in fines. In this context, the social
credit score and smart recognition technologies can tackle such practices,
if mobilized.
However, for Uighur communities, the largest Muslim group in the country,
the situation is more dire (Economist, 2018b). In Xinjiang, policing
operates on a grid management system of about 500 people to keep tab
on the inhabitants. There are booths established at the entry ways to
urban areas, where Uighurs are asked for their identity cards,
photographs, fingerprints and iris scans. They need to turn on their
phones and enter their passwords so a policeman can download content
for analysis. This ‘Web cleansing’ policy has been stated as necessary to
prevent terrorism. Everyone in Xinjiang is required to download a spyware
app on their phones to track social media behavior. Uighurs who do not
comply may be sent to “re-education” camps, which have been reported
to be glorified prisons. Such targeted data surveillance based on group
identities creates fractures in Chinese communities, especially along ethnic
lines.
To conclude, there is no disputing that China is an authoritarian state that
can leverage on the social credit score and other smart technology
systems to track and control its citizens. However, we cannot dismiss the
fact that the state has taken its paternalism seriously by improving the
lives of its citizens on a number of levels. The Chinese government has
brought millions of people out of poverty at an unprecedented rate. They
have made a number of social reforms that allow citizens better access to
capital, social services and economic opportunities. They have succeeded
in instilling pride among many of its citizens as China has become a global
economic superpower. They are leading in technology innovation, rivaling
Silicon Valley, which is no small feat. The Chinese case is a powerful
example of mapping the tension between the oppression of individual
freedom of expression and socio-economic betterment. Given that
majority of the world’s nations are non-democratic, whether we like it or
not, China has become a more realistic aspirational model than some
other states. To dismiss its reforms and technocratic innovations through
moral condemnation is to lose an opportunity to delve into how these
alternative governance models are being formulated and scaled in regions
beyond a Western worldview.
 
Conclusions
The development state has always been a surveillance state. While welfare
is peripheral to the core governance model in wealthy Western nations, it
is central to nation building in India and China given their vast
disadvantaged demographic. This rests on the post-colonial development
paradigm with a paternalistic approach to “conditionality,” defining the
criteria for deservingness. Entitlements used to distribute social benefits in
the West are centered on self-responsibility and individual participation in
the market economy (Eubanks, 2018), while they are tied to group
affiliation in India (caste) and China (ethnicity and rurality) (Arora,
2016b). Welfare recipients do not enjoy the full rights of the average
citizen, be it the United States, India or China. Depending on which
group/individual experiences we decide to focus on, we develop very
different perspectives on what democracy means in these contexts.
The datafication of social behavior in China has proven so far to both
amplify (e.g., tracking Uighurs) as well as disrupt systems of inequality
and oppression (e.g., opportunity to build reputation and access capital for
self-actualization). While ideologies run deep across governance models
and shape the datafication of social systems, China is more explicit in
quantifying virtue. Both Indian and Chinese databased systems are
rationalized to be more inclusive and fairer as they strive to target fake
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identities and systemic corruption through automation. However, as
explicated in this paper, we need to be wary of any techno-centric reform
as it does not necessarily translate to structural changes. It may even give
rise to new forms of deviant practices such as new black markets for
online fake identities.
Centralization should not be used as a proxy for authoritarianism.
Convergence can deliver efficiency but there are trade-offs in terms of
flattening socio-cultural contexts, that can in turn affect the outcome of
these centralized data systems. Independent regulators and strong data
protection services and laws are essential to prevent these centralized
systems from becoming vulnerable to leakages and privacy violations. The
relationship between the public and the private sector appears to be
evolving in both the Indian and the Chinese contexts. In India, for
instance, technology companies have worked with the state closely to
build the nation after two centuries of colonization. However, it is worth
opening this relationship up to further investigation to see who is in
control now — the state or the technology sector. While the Chinese
government has a tighter reign on their digital economies, there may be
changes here too as their tech industries become global actors and
powerful entitites in their own right.
Furthermore, we cannot only adopt the rights lens to privacy in India and
China as it is indeed a privileged position to have. Privacy has long been a
luxury. Their populations have been chronically tracked through surveys as
part of the development project and have for generations experienced
persistent and pervasive publicness. Poverty yields a complex array of
public behaviors that have become institutionalized and even enculturated
over time. This is not to undermine the fact that privacy is a universal
value and fundamental to individual dignity. However, we know little of the
ways in which privacy is materializing among these vast demographics in
India and China, particularly with the onset of these datafied systems.
Alongside rights, we need to consider cultural norms and digital literacies
to capture a more dynamic and non-universalistic approach to privacy
trade-offs.
Lastly, we need to give much more credit to the novel fin tech apparatuses
in the making as this shows a commitment to innovating a solution to the
problem of a dearth of assets among the marginalized majority. Risk has
been recalibrated in an imaginative way to include a vast number of
people into the market economy, allowing them to become empowered
through these choices. While this paper doesn’t excuse censorship and
oppression of activism and free speech that China continues to exercise,
the intent here is to allow for a broader conversation on the notion of
democracy. It takes into account aspirations of the people and their
perspectives on the temporal trade-offs they are willing to ensue as they
mobilize themselves forward. To broaden our understandings of
democracy as practice, we need to recognize that we need to move
beyond the moral high ground where rights become absolutes. We need to
give credence to efficiency through good governance as this is usually the
first tangible encounter that citizens have with the materializing of
democratic values in their everyday lives. 
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